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 NOU 2014:10 - Proposal for New Rules 
Regarding Criminal Insanity and 
Related Issues, Norway post-22 July
LINDA GRÖNING AND GEORG FREDRIK RIEBER-MOHN *
1 The proposal’s background
The criminal case in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in the centre of Oslo and on 
Utøya on 22 July 2011 raised a wide-ranging discussion on the way Norwegian criminal 
law tackles offenders with mental disorders. The discussion conducted in the public de-
bate concerned particularly the configuration of rules on criminal insanity, the role of 
experts in criminal justice and the need for particular sanctions for criminally insane1 
offenders.
The backdrop for this debate was to a large extent the fact that Norwegian criminal law 
uses a ‘medical model’ for the definition of criminal insanity. Under section 44 of the 
Criminal Code, a defendant that is psychotic at the time of the offence is absolved from 
criminal responsibility. This provision essentially ‘equates’ criminal insanity with psy-
chosis, and does not operate with any criteria requiring causality, or any other additional 
(‘psychological’) criteria as is the case in many countries. It has been questioned - par-
ticularly after the 22 July case - whether the medical model gives an erroneous delimita-
tion of who should be absolved from criminal responsibility. It has also been questioned 
whether the experts (most often psychiatrists) have too much power in the determina-
tion of whether a defendant is criminally insane. 
* Linda Gröning is professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, and was a member of 
the law committee that submitted this report. Georg Fredrik Rieber-Mohn was leader of the law 
committee, and is a former Supreme Court Justice and former Prosecutor-General of Norway.
1 In this article, Criminal incapacity will be used as the more general notion, including also 
criminal insanity. The Norwegian rules of criminal incapacity that are detailed further down 
include incapacity on the grounds of young age, unconsciousness, and insanity. Readers should 
be advised that this may differ from American or English concepts of criminal incapacity.
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To investigate the need for legislative change regarding these issues, a committee was 
appointed by the government by way of royal resolution on 25 January 2013.2  The com-
mittee presented its recommendation on 28 october 2014 in the report NOU 2014:10: 
Criminal capacity, expert knowledge, and the protection of society (Skyldevne, sakkyndighet 
og samfunnsvern).3
As a result of the many issues raised by the 22 July case, the committee received multi-
faceted competence, with representatives from the law, medicine and psychology, but 
also specialists in philosophy and ethics. This composition has also led to the committee 
examining the fundamental issues of criminal insanity in a deeper and more multifaceted 
manner than what has been done in previous reports on the topic in Norway.4 
As a basis to understand the committee’s work, it must be emphasised that the terrorist 
attacks on 22 July were the unavoidable backdrop for the committee. The experiences 
from the subsequent court case have influenced the committee’s discussions in various 
ways. Generally the case was significant, as it cannot be ruled out that this type of tragedy, 
or cases that come near, can occur again. To a certain extent have existing rules not been 
able to apprehend such extreme cases as the 22 July case. The committee has nevertheless 
taken the principled position that the 22 July case, with its extreme character, ought not 
to have a decisive effect on the formulation of rules which will usually be applied in much 
less serious cases. The challenge for the committee has therefore been to avoid that the 
22 July case would turn into a guiding reference for the typical application of rules on 
criminal insanity and related issues, while at the same time ensuring that these rules can 
also function in such cases.
2.  The central aspects of the mandate
The committee’s mandate was extensive. The committee was requested to undertake a 
broad assessment of the rules on criminal insanity in section 44 of the Penal Code, with 
particular emphasis on the provision concerning psychosis. The fundamental question 
put to the committee was to which extent persons with serious mental disorders can be 
held criminally responsible for their actions. Attention was also to be paid to criminal 
2 The committee was led by Georg Fredrik Rieber-Mohn and included 11 members. 
3 The report is public and can be accessed in Norwegian on: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/NOU-2014-10/
id2008986/?docId=NOU201420140010000DDDEPIS&q=&navchap=1&ch=2  
[Last accessed 06/07/2015].
4 See NOU 1974:17: Strafferettslig utilregnelighet og strafferettslige særeaksjoner; NOU 1990:5: 
Strafferettslige utilregnelighets- regler og særreaksjoner, straffelovkommisjonens delutredning 
IV. 
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incapacity due to unconsciousness or mental retardation of high degree that are also 
regulated in section 44.5 
The committee was also requested to carry out a wide assessment of the role of experts 
in criminal cases where there is doubt on the perpetrator’s criminal capacity, as well as to 
consider how society should be safeguarded when the defendant is insane and absolved 
from criminal responsibility. 
In its report, the committee chose to break down its conclusions in three main topics, that 
are reflected in the report’s title ‘Criminal capacity, expert knowledge and the protection 
of society.’ These are:
1. Criminal Capacity: Whether the Penal Code should contain rules on criminal insan-
ity, and if so how these should be formulated;
2. Expert Knowledge: Which role experts should have in criminal cases that raise issues 
of criminal insanity; and 
3. The Protection of Society: How society should protect itself from criminally insane 
persons who can be dangerous for the public at large, with a particular focus on the 
need for special criminal sanctions.
In the following an overview will be given of the legislative changes proposed by the com-
mittee in its report, along with the justifications for each of these. The overview is struc-
tured following the report’s main topics as outlined above, and the committee’s mandate 
will be detailed for each of these issues to the extent necessary. 
The report was presented with only few dissenting or separate statements. Most of these 
dissenting and separate statements are related to issues of a more technical nature, where 
there was agreement in substance, but where different views were held on the configura-
tion and formulation of the Penal Code. In this summary, only dissenting statements of a 
more substantial nature will be mentioned.
3.  Criminal capacity 
3.1 Existing rules on criminal insanity
The current Penal Code specifies in sections 44 and 46 the circumstances which indi-
cate a lack of criminal capacity and exoneration from criminal responsibility. Section 44 
5 See part 3 below. 
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determines that the perpetrator is absolved of criminal responsibility if they were ‘psy-
chotic’,  ‘unconscious’, or ‘mentally retarded to a high degree’ at the time of the offence.6 
The word ‘psychotic’ refers to the equivalent medical term, but the provision requires that 
the psychosis must be discernible at the time of the offence through obvious symptoms. 
A person that suffers from psychosis, but is under medication – and thus not (actively) 
psychotic – at the time of the offence, is therefore not included in the provision. The 
word ‘unconscious’ refers to extremely rare cases where the perpetrator has acted with-
out perceiving their surroundings whatsoever, often with a subsequent loss of memory. 
Such cases can for example occur when sleepwalking or during an epileptic seizure. The 
expression ‘mentally retarded to a high degree’ in section 44 exonerates offenders with 
seriously impaired intellectual capacity. Under section 46 are minors under 15 years of 
age free from criminal responsibility. 
The various grounds for criminal incapacity are thus all defined by specifying a particu-
lar condition – young age, unconsciousness, mental retardation and psychosis – which, 
when established at the time of the offence, lead to unconditional exoneration from crim-
inal responsibility. This type of provision has often been described as a medical or biolog-
ical model, in contrast to the so-called mixed models which many states operate with. A 
provision based on a mixed principle encompasses not only criteria based on a specific 
condition, but also typically psychological criteria and/or causality criteria. Under such a 
rule, it is therefore not sufficient that a perpetrator is in a particular condition at the time 
of the offence, but it must also be assessed how that condition has impacted the commis-
sion of the offence. 
The medical model has been under much discussion after 22nd July, particularly in re-
lation to the criteria of ‘psychosis’ and the division of roles between experts and judges. 
Under existing rules, it is the court that has the ultimate say on whether one of the above-
mentioned conditions existed at the time of the offence, but in practice experts have 
through their reports and conclusions had considerable – and often decisive – influence 
on the result.
Under its mandate the committee was asked to pay particular attention to the provision 
regarding psychosis. The age of criminal responsibility was outside of the committee’s 
remit. The central legislative changes proposed for the criminal insanity rules will be 
explained in the following. 
6 An English version of the Penal Code is available at http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/
cgi-bin/sok.cgi?type=LOV  [Last accessed 06/07/2015].
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3.2 The proposal for a new rule in section 44 of the Penal Code
The report proposes a new formulation of the rule on exemption from criminal respon-
sibility on the grounds of insanity. The proposal preserves the medical model, though in 
a considerably watered-down form, and is as follows:
‘A person whom the court deems to have been psychotic at the time of committing the 
act, or in a condition which, due to reduced functioning, disordered thinking, or other-
wise to the inability to comprehend their relationship with their surroundings, must be 
equated with psychosis, is free from criminal responsibility. The same applies to a person 
who acted under a severe disorder of consciousness.’
The basis for the committee’s deliberations was the justification for punishment in gen-
eral. In line with the justifications for punishment which Norwegian criminal law places 
particular emphasis on, criminal responsibility presupposes that the perpetrator has had 
a choice of action and can be blamed for the choice taken. In other words, the fundamen-
tal principle of guilt is central: only those that could and should have acted differently, 
and therefore can be blamed, should be held responsible and punished.
Certain offenders must be deemed to be in such a confused and abnormal state of mind 
at the time of the offence that they should not be held accountable for their act. It would 
be profoundly unjust to hold these individuals responsible and to punish them. As such 
criminal law must encompass rules on criminal insanity.
Crime prevention is another purpose of criminal law which is often emphasised. With 
regards to this purpose, the committee has also taken the stance that there is no ben-
efit from holding liable those that are in such a confused and abnormal state of mind. 
The criminal justice system’s regulating effect on behaviour – that is, its ability to induce 
members of the public to obey the law through deterrence and the formation of norms – 
is not weakened by absolving these persons of criminal responsibility.
When devising with rules on criminal incapacity on the grounds of mental illness, the 
prime challenge is to achieve accuracy, such that freedom from responsibility only ap-
plies to those persons that should be exempted under criminal law’s moral justifications. 
Since criminal insanity is a legal and social construct, it will always be possible to argue 
that a rule includes too many or too few. The committee has nevertheless taken as an 
ethical premise that while it is unfortunate to absolve too many, it is far worse to convict 
offenders that cannot be blamed for their actions. With this as a background, the report 
thoroughly discusses whether the medical model should be kept as a rule for criminal 
incapacity. 
It first seemed judicious for the committee to propose a rule based on a mixed principle, 
which wouldn’t ‘blindly’ exonerate the offender who was suffering of a serious mental 
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disorder at the time of the offence, but which in addition would require that this condi-
tion has had an impact on his actions. It might at first be reasonable to assume at such a 
rule would better pinpoint those who should not be held responsible. It would also dis-
tinguish more clearly between the role of the experts, which would be to clinically assess 
the offender’s mental condition, and the court’s task, which would be to determine the 
significance of this condition as an excuse from criminal responsibility in the actual case.
Nevertheless, the committee ultimately considered that great uncertainty and difficulties 
hover over a rule based on a mixed principle. There is no secure basis for the decisive as-
sessment of whether a diagnosed mental disorder has had influence on the perpetrator’s 
offence. It is to some extent contentious in psychiatry whether a psychosis can be ‘partial’ 
and therefore only affect parts of a person’s mind. The dominant view has long been, and 
still is, that psychosis affects the mind in every respect. It would therefore be subject to 
great uncertainty to decide whether there exists a causal relationship between the mental 
condition and the criminal act itself, or whether the offender has understood the signifi-
cance of their action. Faced with such difficult questions, judges would naturally enough 
seek help from experts, who are assumed to best understand the unstable mind. But 
when psychiatry does not have any empirical or unanimous basis to establish whether 
there is a causal link between a psychotic disorder and the actual offence, even experts 
would also be forced to rely on loose assumptions. It is therefore arduous to assume that 
the court’s influence on the final result would be strengthened with such a provision.
It is also a fact that in several of the countries that have mixed rules on criminal insanity, 
these have been met with opposition and criticism. Legislative changes have also been 
put forward to bring rules in line with the medical principle, submitted for example by 
the committee examining reforms of the Penal Code in Denmark, but these have not 
been followed up by the legislature there.
The committee has ultimately reached the conclusion that accuracy is to best be achieved 
within the framework of a provision based on the medical principle. The committee has 
however also concluded that some modifications must be made in the law to avoid the 
problems associated with the current rule. In the provision which the committee rec-
ommends, it is made clear that only offenders which were ‘psychotic’ at the time of the 
offence with a pronounced intensity of psychotic symptoms should be exempted from 
criminal responsibility. This is the mental condition which has the most significant and 
confusing effect on the mind, and thus is best suited to distinguish those who should be 
held accountable, from those who should not due to mental illness.
In the committee’s view, it would however be too narrow to strictly limit criminal insanity 
to offenders who satisfy the legal definition of psychosis. The committee has therefore 
advised that also other conditions which can be equated with psychosis should be cov-
ered by the provision. The justification for exonerating certain offenders with serious 
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mental disorders from criminal responsibility has namely a broader scope than the legal 
definition of psychosis would indicate. The same justification is also relevant for certain 
individuals with serious mental disorders that cannot be diagnosed with psychosis, but 
who can nevertheless have disordered thinking, reduced functioning, or a distorted un-
derstanding of reality, to the same extent and intensity as a person that is ‘psychotic.’ By 
way of opening for an exemption from criminal liability also for the few such cases that 
can conceivably arise, it is hoped that some acutely inequitable convictions can be avoid-
ed. One avoids thereby also that the term ‘psychotic’ is ‘stretched’ to cover these atypical 
cases in order to reach a fair solution.
In its proposal for the second paragraph of section 44, the committee replicates the cur-
rent arrangement that exonerates offenders that were ‘unconscious’ or ‘mentally retarded 
to a high degree’ at the time of the offence. The last category is however supplemented 
with the phrase ‘or similarly impaired.’ The reason for this recommendation is that there 
are individuals that are not mentally retarded from birth, but who later in life become so 
impaired that they function, cognitively and in other regards, in a similarly diminished 
manner to people with high-degree mental retardation. This is particularly applicable 
when extensive brain damage is inflicted for example by accidents or by advanced de-
mentia. There is no reason why these individuals should not be exonerated from criminal 
liability to the same extent as those born with mental retardation.
3.3 The division of roles between experts and the court
To clarify the division of roles between experts and the court has been an important 
issue in the committee’s deliberations. The committee has taken the position that experts 
should limit their participation to the discipline they know and are educated in, and that 
the judge has a clear and independent responsibility to irrevocably decide whether the 
defendant should be convicted or acquitted. 
Under the committee’s proposal, the experts’ task will be to assess the offender’s state 
of mind exclusively on the basis of clinical and scientific evaluation and following the 
international classification system for mental disorders, which is currently ICD-10. The 
experts should in their statement reach a conclusion within this scientific system, but 
should not take position on whether the law’s requirement of ‘psychosis’ (or equivalent) 
is fulfilled. 
This is an important change from practice under current rules, where experts often also 
make statements and reach conclusions about the law’s requirements. In those cases, 
the experts drift towards the law and engage in legal practice (by interpreting the Penal 
Code).
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The medical understanding of psychosis is in the committee’s view nevertheless the most 
important aid for the court when it must determine whether the perpetrator was psy-
chotic in a legal sense at the time of the offence. The most distinctive characteristics and 
typical symptoms of psychosis are also specified in the draft new section 44 paragraph 1. 
It is however apparent from the provision’s wording that it is the court’s assessment which 
is decisive. It also follows that the legal requirement of psychosis will be narrower than 
the medical term. It is thus the court’s task to determine on an independent basis wheth-
er the perpetrator’s disturbed state of mind was of such a character, and was apparent 
with such severe symptoms, that they should not be made criminally liable. This legal 
determination will have a clear empirical basis in the symptoms observed, something 
that experts can help shed light on with their particular knowledge and methodological 
tools. But the experts do not have the prerequisites within their discipline to answer the 
decisive question, which at its core is of a legal nature: was the defendant at the time of 
the offence so mentally disturbed that they should not be held responsible? By drawing 
a clear distinction between the expert and legal assessments, it is accurate to say that the 
proposed provision is built on a somewhat modified medical principle.
3.4 The standard of proof in the determination of criminal incapacity
Under current law it is the perpetrator’s criminal capacity at the time of the offence 
which much be proven by the prosecution. Which standard of proof applies to the deter-
mination of whether the defendant was ‘psychotic’ is however less clear. 
The general standard of proof in criminal law is often formulated by stating that any rea-
sonable doubt should benefit the defendant (‘in dubio pro reo’). This implies that it is far 
from sufficient for conviction that the defendant’s guilt is highly probable. Certain proof 
and a solid persuasion are necessary. This is the same standard of proof that is enshrined 
in the legal systems of most civilised nations, and it has its ethical roots in a desire to 
avoid that innocents are convicted.
The Norwegian Supreme Court has ruled that the general standard of proof applies to 
all preconditions to criminal responsibility. Our highest court has, on the other hand, 
also ruled that the same standard of proof cannot be demanded for the determination 
of whether the perpetrator was or not psychotic, and therefore criminally capable, as for 
whether the defendant actually has committed the offence. A standard of overwhelming 
probability is, however, not sufficient for the determination of criminal capacity. A clari-
fication of these statements has not ensued in current jurisprudence.
The committee discusses thoroughly the standard of proof to apply in the determina-
tion of mental capacity. In this context a number of viewpoints that are expressed in the 
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Oslo district court’s judgement in the 22 July case7 are commented — inter alia, that to 
be deemed criminally insane should work in the defendant’s disfavour. The committee’s 
conclusion is that there are no compelling arguments for having a different standard of 
proof when determining whether the defendant is criminally capable, than for the other 
preconditions for criminal responsibility. It seems deeply unjust to hold some mentally 
disordered persons responsible, and there is no ground to lower the threshold to prove 
guilt in this particular matter.
3.5 Criminal insanity and self-induced intoxication
Section 45 of the Penal Code specifies an exception to the exoneration from criminal 
responsibility under section 44, when the defendant was unconscious at the time of the 
offence. Where unconsciousness was a consequence of self-induced intoxication, it does 
not exempt the defendant from criminal responsibility. In case law, this provision is also 
applied to cases of psychosis triggered by substance abuse. Full criminal responsibility 
under section 45 is engaged as soon as the intoxication was self-induced, and the question 
of whether the state of criminal insanity was self-induced is not relevant.  
The committee recommends that section 45 be changed to the following:
‘A person who has brought upon themselves a condition such as provided in section 44, 
can be liable to a penalty. Such conditions that are an effect of self-induced intoxication 
shall not exclude punishment.’ 
The justifications which warrant exoneration from criminal responsibility for persons 
with serious mental disorders are not, in the committee’s opinion, applicable to the same 
extent when the defendant has brought the actual condition upon themselves, well aware 
that it involves a risk for unacceptable, and perhaps aggressive and violent behaviour. To 
impose criminal responsibility for such risk-taking would, in addition, be assumed to 
have clear preventive effects and reduce the extent of risky behaviour. 
The recommended provision is devised generally and will be applicable for psychosis 
and equivalent conditions, as well as for severe disorders of consciousness. A condition 
is self-induced when it is brought about wilfully or by negligence. A relevant example 
of reprehensible, self-induced psychotic attack can be when a patient ceases to take a 
prescribed medicine, which they know to be necessary to hold the illness in check. The 
patient will often also know that a resurgence of schizophrenic symptoms, for instance, 
can be dangerous for their surroundings. Naturally, a person who risks a severe disorder 
of consciousness due to drinking large quantities of alcohol or consuming hallucinogenic 
substances would fall in under the provision. 
7 The judgment is available at https://lovdata.no/static/file/834/toslo-2011-188627-24e.pdf 
[Last accessed 06/07/2015]. 
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The provision recommended by the committee shifts then the focus from self-induced 
intoxication to self-induced criminal incapacity. The recommendation is a clear depar-
ture from the current section 45, under which it is sufficient for full criminal responsibil-
ity that the intoxication is self-induced, or in other words that the defendant has drunk an 
amount such that they must expect being intoxicated. The threshold applied in case law is 
quite low. The defendant is then fully liable for the offences they commit in a subsequent 
unconscious state – even when they have drunk a quantity of alcohol which is well within 
the range of what is generally considered acceptable in today’s society. On this point, the 
committee finds the current section 45 to be highly inequitable. 
The recommended provision is designed as a facultative rule of criminal responsibility, 
expressed such as the perpetrator ‘can’ be liable to punishment. The justification for this 
is that situations can occur where the defendant admittedly has brought upon themselves 
the condition which lead to criminal incapacity, but where subsequent offences should 
nevertheless not lead to criminal responsibility. The committee envisages here primarily 
exceptional cases where the behaviour cannot be considered as ‘unlawful’, because it is 
within the limits of what is considered generally acceptable. For example, a patient that 
refrains from taking their anti-psychotic medicine, after consultation with a doctor and 
as a step in their treatment, should not be liable for punishment when the unfortunate 
consequence is criminal insanity and the commission of a criminal offence. 
The committee is unanimous that it would not, for the time being, be reasonable to re-
peal the current section 45, which has contributed to the development of an effective 
criminal framework for offences committed under disorders of consciousness resulting 
from self-inflicted intoxication. The committee therefore recommends that section 45 
be maintained alongside the new proposal. It is the committee’s wish, however, that sec-
tion 45 be phased out in case law. It is at the same time recommended that the current 
section 45 should be understood and practiced in such a way that consuming a quantity 
of alcohol generally accepted to be reasonable does not automatically trigger criminal 
responsibility. 
4  Expert Knowledge   
4.1 The role of the experts under existing law 
The committee’s deliberations on expert knowledge have been focused, in accordance 
with the mandate, on the role of psychiatry in criminal cases where there is a doubt about 
the perpetrator’s criminal capacity. The expression ‘forensic psychiatry’ (Norwegian: 
‘rettspsykatri’) covers in this context the service that expert psychiatrists and clinical psy-
chologists, appointed by the court, perform for the criminal justice system in individual 
cases. This service aims first and foremost to ascertain whether the defendant has a men-
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tal illness that is so serious that it can lead to criminal insanity, and whether a criminally 
insane  defendant constitutes a risk for the life or health of members of the public, such 
that a special sanction of compulsory mental health care is appropriate. 
An evaluation of the role of experts in criminal cases implies a broad appraisal of the 
current criminal rules and practice. The Code of Criminal Procedure8 contains a range of 
different provisions which for example give the legal basis for the appointment of experts, 
the court’s definition of their mandate and assignment, and the use of forced psychiatric 
examination. There are in addition a number of other relevant provisions, such as rules 
on the duty of confidentiality in the Mental Health Care Act.9 In relation to the control 
of the expert’s assignment, the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine and its practice 
are also significant. The committee’s deliberations on this point have in other words been 
considerable, and only the most central parts will be highlighted below.
The role of psychiatrists in court has regularly been criticised – from different angles. This 
criticism has been an important backdrop for the committee’s discussions, in the sense 
that it has highlighted important points of controversy in current law and jurisprudence. 
Firstly, criticism has been levelled towards the lack of clarity in the expert’s role as the 
court’s guide, and the tensions that this role entails. The expert’s profession is usually 
associated with treatment of the sick, where the patient’s interests are central. In contrast, 
as for the expert in a criminal case, the defendant is the object of an examination which 
will give the court the basis for reaching the correct decision about criminal insanity. 
The confidentiality and duty of secrecy that are applicable in the first role are in principle 
absent in the second. 
It has also been the subject of frequent criticism that the experts are not sufficiently in-
dependent, and that they have connections with different instances which colour their 
judgment and conclusions. It has likewise been held that they can be too dependent on 
each other, for instance because they have worked closely together for many years. It has 
been claimed that such relations inhibit the independent judgement that each expert is 
required to deliver. In this context it has also been claimed that the external control of 
the expert’s reports, which is primarily carried out by the Norwegian Board on Forensic 
Medicine, is insufficient.
Finally, the committee mentions the criticism that forensic psychiatric experts are given 
more influence in the outcome of the criminal case than can be justified by their disci-
pline’s findings.  It is claimed that the courts endorses almost indiscriminately the view 
expressed by the experts and the conclusions they reach. In this regard, it is alleged that 
the courts are not sufficiently aware of the questions they should ask the experts, and that 
8 ‘Straffeprosessloven’, Act of 22 may 1981 nr. 25, lit. ‘Criminal Procedure Act’.
9 ‘Psykisk helsevernloven’, Act of 02 July 1999 nr. 62, lit. ‘Mental Health Protection Act’.
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there is a lack of guidelines regulating how the experts’ reports should be formed, and 
that the communication between the court and the experts is therefore unsatisfactory.
With these criticisms as a backdrop, the committee has recommended numerous minor 
changes. These will be highlighted below, with focus on the court’s appointment of ex-
perts, the experts’ execution of their assignment and the control that is carried out on 
their performance. 
4.2 Recommendations for changes 
4.2.1 The appointment of experts
According to its mandate, the committee had to consider how best to ensure that the 
prosecution only requests the appointment of experts in those cases where this is neces-
sary. From a due process perspective, it is clearly more objectionable that experts not be 
appointed in cases where there are grounds to review the defendant’s criminal capacity, 
than that experts might be appointed in too many cases. 
The police and prosecution are engaged early on in criminal cases, and it is important 
that these institutions keep a watchful eye for possible signs of serious mental disorder in 
a suspect, and ensure that a preliminary psychiatric examination is performed when such 
signs are apparent. The committee finds it arduous to recommend legal amendments that 
would effectively ensure that the police and prosecution request expert assistance in the 
right cases, but does point towards several measures that may be implemented within 
the existing legal framework. It may in any case be judicious for the Code of Criminal 
Procedure’s overarching provision on police investigation (Section 226) to be amended, 
with an additional reminder to the abovementioned institutions, that ascertaining the 
suspect’s state of mind at the time of the offence is a part of the investigation’s purpose. 
The number of experts that are appointed is regulated by section 139 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The provision determines that only one expert should be appoint-
ed, unless the court considers that the case requires two or more experts. In cases where 
there are doubts on the criminal capacity of the suspect the current practice is neverthe-
less to appoint two experts. The committee is of the opinion that the general rule should 
be the appointment of two experts in these cases. This consistently ensures a more thor-
ough control of the quality of the assessment. When the experts act as intended and each 
have their autonomous and independent assessment of the defendant, notwithstanding 
mutual dialogue and exchanges of views, they supplement each other and contribute to 
the case being adequately clarified. 
Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides also for the court to appoint ad-
ditional experts, beyond the two that are appointed in cases on criminal incapacity, ‘when 
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it finds it necessary’. It was this provision that the legal authority the Supreme Court’s 
Appeal Committee relied on when it accepted that Oslo district court had appointed two 
new experts in the 22 July case, without either of the parties requesting it. The Appeal 
Committee ruled that when two experts had already been appointed at the request of the 
prosecution, the court was free to supplement them without a new motion being filed by 
the parties. 
The committee has analysed the legal situation created by this decision. There were di-
verging opinions about whether the decision is judicious, and whether it is in harmony 
with fundamental principles of criminal procedure. The committee’s deliberations on this 
point are thorough, but do not offer a clear conclusion. It is in the committee’s opinion 
more advisable to leave the continued elucidation of this matter to the newly appointed 
legislative committee which will devise a new Code of Criminal Procedure. 
4.2.2 Competence requirements
The minimum requirement to be appointed as a psychiatric expert is that the expert 
has completed its education as a doctor or psychologist. There is no requirement to have 
completed a speciality, and no obligation for the expert to be registered to use a protected 
title or equivalent. In practice, further professional training is nevertheless arranged for 
those wishing to serve as experts. 
The committee makes no recommendation to change the basic educational curriculum 
to qualify as a doctor or psychologist, nor does it suggest changes in further education in 
the form of specialisation. The most reliable measure to ensure high quality in the work 
done by experts is, in the committee’s opinion, to further professional training courses. 
The established courses should be maintained and allocated more resources. The content 
of the courses should nonetheless be adapted to the altered role experts will have if the 
committee’s recommendation is adopted. As explained above, the experts will study the 
defendant’s state of mind on the basis of clinical and medical assessments, and thus give 
the court the basis for ruling on whether the defendant was criminally insane. The ex-
perts will not conclude their report with a judgement of whether the defendant’s state of 
mind satisfies the law’s requirements.
Expert assignments should primarily be given to professionals who have completed the 
specialist training course. It should be a requirement that at least one of the experts has 
done so when two experts are appointed, which is currently usual in practice and would 
be the general rule under the committee’s suggestion. When – exceptionally – only one 
expert is appointed, it should be a requirement that this expert has completed the special-
ist course. In the committee’s view, it should also be a requirement that at least one of the 
experts appointed has up-to-date clinical experience within their discipline. 
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4.2.3 The experts’ independence
In order for the legal community and for society as a whole to have trust in the work 
of experts, they must appear – as well as be – autonomous and independent. In the cur-
rent Code of Criminal Procedure, the threshold for disqualification of experts in general, 
and not only forensic psychiatrists, has, however, been formulated mildly: ‘when it can 
be avoided,’ a person should not be appointed as expert, who would be disqualified un-
der the rules applicable to judges. And further: ‘as a rule, there should not be appointed 
experts that are in a relation of dependency to each other.’
The committee is of the view that the law’s rules on disqualification should be made more 
stringent and recommends the following provision: ‘A person that would be disqualified 
as a judge in the case, cannot be appointed as expert.’
Likewise, the provision on independence should be considerably stricter. A central pur-
pose of appointing two experts is that they should work independently. The committee 
is of the opinion that experts that have a close relationship to one another, whether that 
is a friendship or a matter of having served as experts together for a number of years, 
can give cause for concern. It isn’t enough that the experts considers themselves to be 
independent, or that they actually are – the court and society at large must also perceive 
that it is so. 
On the other hand, close collaborators cannot be automatically excluded as experts. 
Many will be able to act professionally and with the distance and independence that are 
necessary as an expert. Such an automatic exclusion, in a small country like Norway 
could create considerable problems in appointing qualified experts.
With this balancing act in mind, the committee recommends that the provi-
sion be made stricter along the following lines: ‘The appointment should be 
avoided where connections to parties in the case or other experts, or other cir-
cumstances, may raise doubts as to the expert’s independence or impartiality.’ 
4.2.4. Mandate and statements
Section 142a of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that for all services of ex-
perts ordered by the courts, a written mandate should be provided the expert by the 
court. The formulation of the mandate is important for the expert themselves and their 
work, and particularly as a way to ensure the best possible clarification of the case. The 
provision applies similarly when the prosecution employs an expert at the investigative 
stage, with the difference that it is then the prosecution service that determines the man-
date. This provision also gives the Government competence to enact further regulations 
regarding the composition of the mandate. This delegation power has not been used. 
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The committee was asked to evaluate whether further regulations should be laid down to 
regulate the composition of mandates for experts, and additionally to make a recommen-
dation as to which requirements that should apply to the content of experts’ concluding 
statements. 
For some years now, the practice of the prosecution service has been to use a standard 
mandate, composed in collaboration between the Prosecutor General10 and the Norwe-
gian Board of Forensic Medicine. This is also used by the court when appointing experts. 
The matter of concern is whether this practice is satisfactory, or whether further regu-
lation is necessary. In any case, it would be necessary to adjust the standard mandate to 
reflect the more limited role of experts that the committee recommends, particularly in 
respect with the fact that experts no longer should determine whether the law’s require-
ments for criminal incapacity has been fulfilled, but rather restrict themselves to scientif-
ic and medical assessments. 
The committee has concluded that further regulations should be enacted providing for 
a minimum standard for the composition of the mandate. This standard should prevent 
oversights and undesired variations in the experts’ work. The standard mandate should 
not be regulated in such detail that it would impede a concrete adjustment in the various 
cases that arise, with their peculiarities. The committee is also presenting a draft regu-
lation regarding the guidelines to apply in the composition of the mandate for expert 
assignments in general, and a draft standard mandate for experts in cases pertaining to 
criminal insanity and related issues.
For criminal rulings to be as correct as possible, it is also essential that the courts un-
derstand all evidence in the case. Uncertainties and possible errors must be brought to 
light. Expert statements are written by doctors or psychologists. Reviewing them there-
fore requires specialist knowledge, which neither the prosecution service nor the courts 
possess. Both prosecutors and judges are often encouraged to rely on the experts’ assess-
ments. These statements are thus granted substantial weight in their own right, and are 
often characterised as authoritative evidence.
But the legal profession is not entirely without recourse to control these reports, when 
asking the right questions. It is in that way possible to examine whether the factual basis 
for the expert’s assessment is satisfactory. It is also to a certain extent possible to control 
whether there is a logical correlation between the examination’s factual foundations and 
the conclusions drawn. 
An important requirement to ensure a satisfactory level of control by the court is in any 
case that the experts must expressly convey any uncertainty they may have, whether that 
is in relation to the facts the statement is built on, or to the medical diagnosis they have 
10 ‘Riksadvokaten’, the highest prosecuting authority in Norway, lit. ‘Royal Prosecutor’.
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reached. Another important requirement is that the experts must be aware of their role 
to pass on knowledge, and that they express themselves using a terminology that enables 
legal professionals in court to understand what is said.
It is also decisive that legal professionals have a certain grasp of the experts’ discipline, 
if they are to review the statements made. The assessment of evidence, and psychiatry, 
are not part of the university curriculum for legal studies. In addition, most of Norway’s 
350 professional judges will rarely, if ever, be assigned cases where criminal incapaci-
ty is an issue. The committee cannot envisage any easy solution to remedy this lack of 
competence. It is of the opinion that it is most sensible for the courts, the police, and the 
prosecution service, to ensure themselves that measures to improve competence levels 
are implemented, given that only few such cases arise per year.
4.2.4 The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine
The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine has as its overarching mission to carry 
out control and review within all subdisciplines of forensic medicine, and is divided in 
subgroups in charge of a specific area of expertise. The forensic psychiatry group consists 
of six psychiatrists and three psychologists. The most significant external control of ex-
perts’ work is thus performed in the commission, by specialists who presumably possess 
at least equal competence to the experts. Apart from control in individual criminal cases, 
the Board has a more general supervisory function. The committee was asked to assess 
several aspects of the commission’s activities.
Members of the Board are currently appointed by the government, with secretarial sup-
port from the Civil Affairs Authority.11 This gives a satisfactory guarantee for the inde-
pendence of the Board. It is decisive for the commission’s legitimacy that its leaders and 
members have high scientific and specialist competance. Not only does this ensure high 
quality when performing control in individual cases, it also provides a sound basis for the 
Board to contribute to scientific development within the discipline and ensure a consis-
tent practice among the experts that regularly participate in the criminal justice system. 
As a result of the sharp distinction the committee is advocating between scientific/medi-
cal support and the legal assessment undertaken by the court, the Board of Forensic Med-
icine’s supervisory function will be defined more clearly, and should be easier to relate to. 
To ensure a high level of competence in the Board, the committee suggests that a pro-
fessional appoinment committee be established to make recommendations when new 
members of the Board’s subgroup for forensic psychiatry are to be appointed. At least one 
of the appointment committee’s members should be a university professor in psychiatry 
or psychology. This would strengthen the Board’s independence. The committee recom-
11 ‘Statens sivilrettsforvaltning’, lit. the Government’s civil law administration.
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mends also that the administration of the Board be supplemented by a legal professional 
that would have the important task of clarifying the distinction between medical and 
legal assessments in criminal cases..
The Board’s primary task is to inspect and control the statements that court-appointed 
experts give to the court, a copy of which they are obliged to send to the Board. The 
committee recommends also that experts who wish to make a statement concerning psy-
chiatric issues of relevance in a criminal case, but who are not appointed by the court, 
should be required to (also) submit their statement to the court in writing, a copy of 
which should be sent to the commission for inspection.
Three of the Board’s members participate in this inspection. In principle, the Board has 
the authority to review all aspects of the experts’ work, including the factual basis it is 
built on. In practice, the inspection is limited to a study of the written statement, where 
the commission ensures first and foremost that there is a logical correlation between the 
examination’s factual foundations and the conclusions drawn, besides ensuring that the 
statement is not based on conflicting assumptions. The committee recommends that this 
procedure be maintained, with minor changes. In particular should the Board’s conclu-
sions reflect to a clearer extent the exact inspection that has been carried out. The com-
mittee has drafted new formulations which may be used by the commission when writing 
inspection conclusions.
5.  The protection of Society
5.1. Current rules on special sanctions for insane perpetrators
The provisions on criminal insanity entail that an offender can be exonerated from 
criminal responsibility. A criminally insane offender is without criminal capacity, and 
therefore is innocent, both in principle and in fact. 
Even so, it can be necessary to intervene with force towards such an offender, in order to 
protect the public from new crimes. Under current criminal law, provisions are made in 
this regard to use special sanctions, which are to ensure that an offender that is presumed 
to be dangerous does not reoffend. This is achieved by carrying out coercive measures as 
well as medical treatment for their mental disorder.
These measures are regulated by sections 39 and 39a of the Penal Code, which open for 
the use of special sanctions, respectively to transfer [the offender] to compulsory mental 
care and to transfer to compulsory care. The former is intended for offenders that are 
criminally incapable due to psychosis, to severe disorders of consciousness, or equiva-
lent, while the latter is intended for the intellectually disabled. The law’s requirements 
are the same for both categories. In order to impose these sanctions, it is required that 
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1) a serious crime involving a violation of integrity has been committed (the provision 
itemises certain crimes that match this description), and there is an imminent risk that a 
new crime be committed which would set other persons’ life or health at risk or encroach 
on their freedom, or that 2) a less serious crime of the same type has been committed, and 
the danger for new such crimes is particularly imminent.
There is thus a high threshold under Norwegian law in order to apply these special crim-
inal sanctions. This is justified by the view that criminal law should not, in principle, 
impose a reaction upon offenders who are without guilt. As a result, other statutory pro-
visions, giving authority to impose coercive measures within health and social legisla-
tion, play a major role in ensuring that the appropriate measures are imposed on those 
offenders. The most important provision is to be found in the Mental Health Care Act. 
But those provisions do not, to the same degree as provisions in criminal law, take into 
account the potential dangerousness of an offender. 
5.2. Recommendations for changes in the provisions regulating special sanctions
The committee finds it necessary to maintain a system of special criminal sanctions. 
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting itself from the danger that some criminally 
incapable offenders represent. Nevertheless, the committee is of the opinion that such 
preventive measures as special sanctions are at odds with our culture’s strong emphasis 
on individuals’ freedom. The threshold for the deprivation of liberty that special sanc-
tions entail should therefore be high.  The committee wishes to underline that such an 
encroachment on personal freedom is only justified when it is suitable, when it is neces-
sary, and when it is proportional to the benefits it seeks to protect.
The committee is of the view that there are sensible reasons to allow for verdicts of special 
sanctions to protect the life, health and freedom of members of the public, as the basic 
legal values that sections 39 and 39a is designed to safeguard. The committee would nev-
ertheless recommend changing these provisions so that they become applicable to a few 
more cases than they currently do. The committee has studied some cases where relative-
ly serious crimes had been committed, which involved violations of personal integrity, 
and where there was considered to be an important risk of new and serious criminality, 
but where the law’s strict requirements regarding the crimes committed was nonetheless 
not deemed to be met. In the committee’s view, special sanctions should be applicable 
to such cases, not least because the possibilities for coercive treatment under the Mental 
Health Care Act offer insufficient protection. 
More concretely, the committee considers it a good starting point that the provision is 
devised with a high threshold for the level of danger required to trigger its application. 
However, in the committee’s view, the present law attaches too much importance to 
whether certain crimes have been committed, and the committee wishes that attention 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2015
127
rather should be directed to the danger to important legal values. The level of danger 
required should be higher when the value at stake is of relatively lower importance, but 
should be markedly lower when a particularly significant value, such as life, is threatened, 
for example where there is a risk of murder. In that way, the danger assessment performed 
by the court would become relative to a certain extent, depending on the importance of 
the threatened value. 
Furthermore, the committee considers that the provision’s first requirement, regarding 
the offence which is required to have taken place, should be designed to reflect the risk 
posed by the perpetrator to the life, health, and freedom of others, but should not be for-
mulated overly strictly. Offenders that represent a real risk for important values should 
fall under the provision. The minimum requirement must be that an action is taken which 
puts the life, health or freedom of others at risk. The committee recommends removing 
the current requirement that a ‘serious’ violation has been committed.
5.3 General recommendations for the implementation of the sanctions 
The committee takes for granted that the mental health service as a whole should have 
the responsibility for placing and treating offenders that have been imposed a special 
criminal sanction. The offender should be treated with the overarching principle that 
they are absolved of criminal responsibility, and thus cannot be blamed for the miscon-
duct that is the basis for the sanction. This also means that they should not be subjected to 
other limitations of their freedom, than those that are strictly necessary for the protection 
of others.
Within these limitations, any stay at an institution should be filled with positive and 
meaningful content. The institutions that look after this group must be adequately staffed 
by professionals and receive the resources they need. It should generally be ensured that 
special criminal sanctions of compulsory care are something completely different than 
punishment, and that punitive elements are not present when the sanctions are carried 
out. In the committee’s opinion, this is essential out of consideration for the Norwegian 
constitution, as well as Norway’s human rights obligations. The committee therefore rec-
ommends a new provision in the Mental Health Care Act’s chapter on the implementa-
tion of special criminal sanctions. The provision would entail that persons transferred to 
compulsory mental health care may not be subjected to further limitations and encroach-
ments to their freedom than is necessary for their treatment and for the protection of the 
patient themselves, other patients, and for society as a whole. Within these limitations, 
everything should be done to ensure these patients live as normal a life as possible. It is 
recommended that this provision also be made applicable to the intellectually disabled 
who are in compulsory care.  
128
Linda Gröning and Georg Fredrik Rieber-Mohn
5.4. Commitment in closed institutions
Under current rules, the court has neither influence on the actual execution of the 
special criminal sanction, nor in fact on the issue of how the protection of the public 
should be guaranteed during that time. The only requirement that follows from current 
rules is that any person who is transferred to compulsory mental health care must be 
placed in an institution as an in-patient for the first three weeks.12 The committee has de-
liberated whether this procedure is sufficient to safeguard the public, given that medical 
staff are –after the initial three-weeks-period– at liberty to choose less restrictive forms 
of treatment. 
It is undeniable that for some of the offenders who are imposed compulsory mental health 
care, there might be a danger to the public that is related to an illness, or a state of mind, 
which there is little hope to cure in the foreseeable future. Members of this group can be 
detected with a high degree of reliability. In order to ensure a stabile treatment for this 
group of patients, and to protect the public, the committee has reached the conclusion 
that it should be possible for the court to specify in its verdict that this particular type of 
offenders is committed round-the-clock into a closed psychiatric institution until further 
notice. The committee recommends that the conditions for such a commitment is that 
there are no prospects of any speedy or substantial improvement in the offender’s health 
of mind, and that the protection of the public, or other significant interests, requires it. 
This entails that the court sets a frame for the work of the attending physician, which 
also means that medical staff will to a much lower extent have to constantly reassess the 
danger represented by their patient at any one time. Discharge from a closed institution 
could in those cases only be ordered by the prosecution service, or if the prosecution is 
opposed to the discharge, by the court upon request from the offender.
5.5. Duration of the commitment
As is currently the case, special criminal sanctions would under the committee’s rec-
ommendations be of an indeterminate duration. The prosecution service can decide to 
lift the sanction. Otherwise, the termination of the sanction must be requested to the 
court at the behest of offender themselves or their next of kin, though this motion may 
only be lodged from one year after the verdict or any possible appeals have become final. 
If such a motion is unsuccessful, a new motion can be lodged one year after the original 
motion or any successive appeal have become final.
12 Act No. 62 of 2 July 1999 relating to the provision and implementation of mental health care (the 
Mental Health Care Act), available in English at http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/
lov-19990702-062-eng.pdf. 
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The committee was asked to consider whether the seriousness of the crime commit-
ted should have any implication for the length of the intervals at which motions can be 
lodged, but refuses to entertain such a thought. This would most worryingly result in 
special criminal sanctions taking on more markedly the character of a punishment.
Since it is recommended that the court be given the power to decide that the offender 
should be consigned to a closed institution round-the-clock, the question will arise of 
how long such a commitment should be. The committee considers that the prosecution 
service should be able to lift the commitment when it is no longer needed, for example 
because the circumstances are altered radically because the offender suffers from a se-
rious physical illness. The offender or their next-of-kin may also lodge a request to the 
court to lift the commitment a year after it was ordered, and then once a year. 
The committee has also discussed whether there should be access to impose a minimum 
duration for this type of round-the-clock commitments, with the consequence that the 
offender and their next-of-kin cannot request that the sanction be lifted before the min-
imum duration is over. This question may be relevant in a few cases where criminally 
incapable offenders represent a particularly high risk to the public. 
In considering the need for a minimum duration, the committee was divided. The ma-
jority found no reason to introduce a minimum duration. A lot can change after the of-
fender is committed to a closed institution. They can for example have sustained injuries 
or illness, which physically prevent them from reoffending. It is also doubtful how much 
is to be gained by depriving the offender of the fundamental right to judicial review of 
the forced commitment. As long as they are regarded as dangerous and remain in closed 
institution, the possibility of judicial reviews at one-year intervals cannot be too demand-
ing.
The minority is of the opinion that it is necessary to give the court possibility to stipulate 
a minimum duration for forced commitment, of up to three years. This is particularly 
justified out of consideration for the calm necessary in the programme of treatment, but 
also to a certain extent by the public’s expectation for a more durable protection from this 
group of offenders. It is also economical to avoid court proceedings in cases where the 
result is a certainty. If changes occur in the offender’s situation, for example because the 
offender contracts a serious illness that makes forced commitment unnecessary, there is 
a sufficient guarantee in the fact that the prosecution service can lift the sanction at any 
time.
5.6. Transfer to the correctional services
The current section 5-6 of the Mental Health Care Act contains a restricted possibility 
to transfer an offender who has been imposed a compulsory mental health care measure 
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to a facility managed by the correctional services. That means that a person who was 
understood as criminally insane, and therefore not met with imprisonment, may in some 
cases be transferred to prison. Such transfer may only take place when the person is no 
longer psychotic and criminally insane, but still particularly dangerous for the public.   
The committee is unanimous in considering it as a matter of principle both unfortunate 
and unsatisfactory that persons that are not criminally responsible should be sent to pris-
on. However the committee is divided with regards to the conclusions that should be 
drawn from this ethical standpoint. 
The majority is of the opinion that a transfer procedure is necessary in extraordinary cas-
es, and that this possibility should remain until the mental health services have facilities 
and resources to enable them to care for difficult patients in a satisfactory manner. The 
need for a transfer to the correctional services is present when the mental health services 
have nothing to offer the offender, and where the costs and difficulties of retaining the 
patient become disproportionately high. 
The majority is recommending additional precisions to section 5-6 of the Mental Health 
Care Act, which would further restrict and clarify the requirements for a transfer to take 
place. It must be a precondition that a specific treatment programme for the offender is 
already established under the auspices of the correctional services, which contains no pu-
nitive element and which is clearly separate from what is offered to other inmates. Such 
a restricted transfer procedure would not be in breach of constitutional or international 
obligations.
A minority is however of the view that the transfer procedure should be abolished. In the 
opinion of the minority, it is highly problematic that section 5-6 gives the possibility to 
place persons with severe mental illness, who cannot be blamed for their crimes, in pris-
on. The type of prison confinement which would inevitably be the result of such a transfer 
would be arduous to distinguish from criminal incarceration, with all its unpleasantness. 
This would be the case regardless of how ‘nicely’ the law may dictate how the transferee is 
to be treated. Section 5-6 of the Mental Health Care Act should consequently be repealed, 
in the minority’s opinion. 
6.  Postscript: The status of the legislative process 
The legislative process has continued after the proposal. The proposal has been the 
object of a consultation round to the government and many different institutions and or-
ganisations have replied.13 The reactions to the proposals have been diverse. Surprisingly 
13 See https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/Horing--Tilregnelighetsutvalgets-utredning-
NOU-2014-10-Skyldevne-sakkyndighet-og-samfunnsvern/id2341869/    
[Last accessed 06/07/2015].
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many of the responding instances have been positive towards keeping a medical mod-
el for the rule on criminal insanity, and many of those have welcomed the committee’s 
amendment recommendations. Many have also been positive towards the proposal to 
enforce a stricter division between forensic psychiatric experts and the court, as well as to 
the recommended changes to rules on special criminal sanctions. 
But there have also been critical remarks. Several of the responding instances expressed 
their wish to see the medical model abolished, and replaced by a mixed model that would 
require that the specific effect of the mental disorder on the commission of the criminal 
offence also be evaluated. Several instances were particularly critical to the choice to keep 
the term ‘psychosis’ due to the stigmatising effect the use of this term might have on those 
with mental disorders. And some has also been critical towards the changes regarding the 
role of the experts and the rules on special criminal sanctions. 
In the end, these different reactions reflect the difficulty in regulating criminal insanity 
in a way that is both understood as principally adequate and legally practical. It also re-
flects that there are many different opinions in society when it comes to matters of crime, 
criminal responsibility and criminal sanctions. In this context, it will be interesting to see 
what legal changes, if any, this proposal will eventually result in. The next step is, in that 
case, a Draft resolution from the government that will form the basis for enactment of 
new legislation in parliament (Stortinget). 
